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REMEMBERING JUDGE 
TOWNSEND 
 
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 1 (January 1984). 
 
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
1984 is here. Criminal defense attorneys should pause to remember the admonitions 
of one of Georgia's most memorable judges and ardent defenders of individual rights. 
Judge J. M. C. "Red" Townsend was born in Wildwood, Dade County, in 1898 and 
died at Emory University Hospital on October 6, 1961. Judge Townsend, whose 
Memorial is at 105 Ga. App. XXIII (1962), served as a Superior Court Judge in the 
Cherokee Circuit from 1944 until 1947 and as a member of the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia from 1947 until his death in 1961.  
Few men have been as beloved as Judge Townsend. People loved him because of his 
humanity and goodness. They also loved him because he constantly reminded them, 
lawyers as well as laymen, of the transcendent value of the principles underlying and 
protected by the Bill of Rights and by the notion of due process of law.  
Take, for example, Judge Townsend's dissenting opinions in Bacon v. State, 85 Ga. 
App. 630, 70 S. E. 2d 54 (1952), and Hodges v. State, 85 Ga. App. 617, 70 S. E. 2d 48 
(1952). In both these cases Judge Townsend resolutely opposed any inroads on the 
"other crimes rule" (which bars introduction of substantive evidence that the 
defendant has committed crimes other than those he is on trial for) and expressed deep 
concern that the various exceptions to the rule were swallowing up the rule. Shortly 
thereafter the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted Judge Townsend's views and cited 
his opinions approvingly. Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S. E. 2d 615 (1952).  
Judge Townsend's greatest opinion, however, was the one in Winston v. State, 79 Ga. 
App. 711, 54 S. E. 2d 354 (1949), where he eloquently urged adoption of the rule 
forbidding the use of illegally seized evidence in criminal trials. Judge Townsend 
wrote:  
   
 
Speaking for the writer alone, the decisions of our  
of our Supreme Court making admissible evidence obtained  
through the criminal acts of peace officers amounting to an  
unlawful, unwarranted, unreasonable, and reprehensible  
violation of our two most sacred documents aside from Holy  
Writ, present a most deplorable paradox. These decisions  
have had the effect of making but an empty shell of what  
was intended by the framers of these great guaranties of  
liberty to be the living seed of freedom. The Bills of Rights  
were ordained and established to protect the citizens  
against his public officers. A part of the first provision  
of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (article I,  
section 1, paragraph 1) provides as follows: "Public  
officers are the trustees and servants of the people,  
and at all times amenable to them."  
The foregoing decisions of our Supreme Court,  
coupled with the law not in conflict therewith,  
say in effect to the peace officers of this State,  
"You shall not make an unreasonable search and  
seizure of the of the home of a citizen, because  
his home is his castle. The breaking down  
of his door is a trespass for which  
you are responsible both civilly and criminally.  
An unlawful search and seizure by you  
amounts to a violation of the most sacred rights  
under or organic law. However, if you do make  
such a search, bring the evidence thus obtained  
into a court of justice, and it will be given the same  
consideration as evidence honorably obtained.  
This does not make our peace officers the servants  
and trustees contemplated in the first provision of  
our Constitution, nor does it confine our courts  
to this category. It affords a poor protection  
to the citizen from the outlawry of his public servants. 
 
Id. at 714-15, 54 S. E. 2d at 356. See also Goodwin v. Allen, 89 Ga. App. 187, 78 S. E. 
2d 804 (1953) (Townsend, J.); Townsend, Should the Law Suffer Itself to Become an 
Enemy to Its Own Reign?, 12 Ga. B. J. 139 (1949); see generally Wilkes, "A Most 
Deplorable Paradox": Admitting Illegally Obtained Evidence in Georgia-Past, 
Present, and Future, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 105, 125-26 (1976).  
The noble principles Judge Townsend advocated remain as valid and important as 
ever, but they have fallen on hard times. For example, Judge Townsend's concern 
about the exceptions to the other crimes rule would reduce the rule to a mere formality 
have been largely realized. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 272 S. E. 2d 321 
(1980) (evidence that defendant, charged with selling marijuana, sold marijuana to 
drug agents on two subsequent occasions is admissible to prove identity); McCarty v. 
State, 165 Ga. App. 241, 299 S. E. 2d 95 (1983) (evidence that defendant, charged 
with stealing from his employer, stole from another employer over 11 years 
previously is admissible to show pattern of conduct).  
Moreover, the exclusionary rule in search and seizure, applied to Georgia just months 
before Judge Townsend's death, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 
L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), is in grave danger of being destroyed or of being eviscerated 
even more than it has been during the last few years. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U. S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).  
If we re-read Judge Townsend's opinions, if we reconsider his philosophy, we may be 
able to restore balance to criminal procedure and thereby end the grotesque and 
dangerous advantage that now favors the state and its police, prosecutors, and agents. 
That is why remembering Judge Townsend is so important.  
 
